The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

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  • Create Date:2021-06-26 08:54:12
  • Update Date:2025-09-07
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  • Author:Thomas S. Kuhn
  • ISBN:0226458121
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Summary

A good book may have the power to change the way we see the world, but a great book actually becomes part of our daily consciousness, pervading our thinking to the point that we take it for granted, and we forget how provocative and challenging its ideas once were—and still are。 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is that kind of book。 When it was first published in 1962, it was a landmark event in the history and philosophy of science。 Fifty years later, it still has many lessons to teach。

With The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn challenged long-standing linear notions of scientific progress, arguing that transformative ideas don’t arise from the day-to-day, gradual process of experimentation and data accumulation but that the revolutions in science, those breakthrough moments that disrupt accepted thinking and offer unanticipated ideas, occur outside of “normal science,” as he called it。 Though Kuhn was writing when physics ruled the sciences, his ideas on how scientific revolutions bring order to the anomalies that amass over time in research experiments are still instructive in our biotech age。

This new edition of Kuhn’s essential work in the history of science includes an insightful introduction by Ian Hacking, which clarifies terms popularized by Kuhn, including paradigm and incommensurability, and applies Kuhn’s ideas to the science of today。 Usefully keyed to the separate sections of the book, Hacking’s introduction provides important background information as well as a contemporary context。  Newly designed, with an expanded index, this edition will be eagerly welcomed by the next generation of readers seeking to understand the history of our perspectives on science。

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Reviews

David

I went into this book aware of the enormous hype around it, so naturally I was prepared to be - if not disappointed - somewhat underwhelmed, but boy was I whelmed! Kuhn's book (essay?) is the perfect illustration of how seemingly banal theories can become illuminating when fleshed out in repetitive detail。 It's also an exemplar of skillful writing (apart from the odd sentence with one too many parts), exact choice of scope, careful thought, and brilliant insight。In conclusion, the hype is, witho I went into this book aware of the enormous hype around it, so naturally I was prepared to be - if not disappointed - somewhat underwhelmed, but boy was I whelmed! Kuhn's book (essay?) is the perfect illustration of how seemingly banal theories can become illuminating when fleshed out in repetitive detail。 It's also an exemplar of skillful writing (apart from the odd sentence with one too many parts), exact choice of scope, careful thought, and brilliant insight。In conclusion, the hype is, without a doubt, justified! 。。。more

Silvia Matei

I found it hard to read。 It comes from a place of absolute love for the scientific method。 You can definitely feel the passion。

Boro

Singlehandedly refuelled me for research。 So happy I randomly picked this up for casual reading。

Hamish Seamus

Excellent。Walks a tightrope between insanity and banality。 The insane side is the denial of an objective world。 The banal side is simple statement that scientific communities change their mind sometimes。We like to think that science is advancing towards the truth。 Kuhn asserts that it's hard to pin down exactly what this means (perhaps he wouldn't have been so pessimistic if he'd known more information theory?), so it seems more correct to say that science is instead moving away from its initial Excellent。Walks a tightrope between insanity and banality。 The insane side is the denial of an objective world。 The banal side is simple statement that scientific communities change their mind sometimes。We like to think that science is advancing towards the truth。 Kuhn asserts that it's hard to pin down exactly what this means (perhaps he wouldn't have been so pessimistic if he'd known more information theory?), so it seems more correct to say that science is instead moving away from its initial position。I like to think of it like this。 The "advancing towards" view says that we start at 0, and the truth is at 1。 Science is a series which converges towards 1。 We can further differentiate two species of convergence: science arrives at 1 within a finite number of steps (science reaches a stationary endpoint), or science converges towards but never reaches 1 (for any given error e, there exists a time t after which we will know the truth within e)。 The "advancing from" view, on the other hand, sees the truth as being at infinity。 We can have an ininite series of models, each more useful than the last, but none of them true, and each introducing at least as many problems as it solves。Even so brief an epitome reveals striking resemblances to the discovery of oxygen: before experimenting with red oxide of mercury, Lavoisier had performed experiments that did not produce the results anticipated under the phlogiston paradigm; Roentgen’s discovery commenced with the recognition that his screen glowed when it should not。 In both cases the perception of anomaly— of a phenomenon, that is, for which his paradigm had not readied the investigator— played an essential role in preparing the way for perception of novelty。 But, again in both cases, the perception that something had gone wrong was only the prelude to discovery。 Neither oxygen nor X-rays emerged without a further process of experimentation and assimilation。 In science, as in the playing card experiment, novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background provided by expectation。 Initially, only the anticipated and usual are experienced even under circumstances where anomaly is later to be observed。 Further acquaintance, however, does result in awareness of something wrong or does relate the effect to something that has gone wrong before。 That awareness of anomaly opens a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the initially anomalous has become the anticipated。 At this point the discovery has been completed。 I like to think of it like this。 A paradigm is a normal distribution。 When a paradigm is imprecise, or we don't have much data, it's hard to tell how well the paradigm fits the data。 But as a paradigm consolodates and we observe more phenomena, it will start to become apparent if there is a second mode in the data not accounted for in our distribution。 At this point we need to somehow re-organise the data to form a new paradigm/normal distribution。Along these lines: when I was younger I felt inclined to dismiss the entirety of medieval scholarship as an embarassing misstep。 My impression was that it was entirely predicated on fundmantally wrong ideas, specifically those of Christian Theology。 More recently, when I made an effort to be more charitable, I started to discern a more interesting story。 St Augustine seems to have been pretty much entirely wrong in everything he ever said。 However, he elevated the vague and confused worldview of his society into something clear and articulate which everyone could agree was what they had meant all along。 This nailed down the target, so to speak, so that Thomas Aquinus knew what obstacles he had to move out of the way, when finally Francis Bacon came along and starting shooting down the old belief system, nothing too important was taken down in the process (ie, the whole belief system had started the migration process from the God Operating System to the Secular Operating System)。 In Kuhnian language, St Augustine was a paradigm builder, Thomas Aquinus was a novelty-noticer, and Francis Bacon introduced a new paradigm。If Einsteinian science seems to make Newtonian dynamics wrong, that is only because some Newtonians were so incautious as to claim that Newtonian theory yielded entirely precise results or that it was valid at very high relative velocities。 Since they could not have had any evidence for such claims, they betrayed the standards of science when they made them。 In so far as Newtonian theory was ever a truly scientific theory supported by valid evidence, it still is。 Since new paradigms are born from old ones, they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative, that the traditional par adigm had previously employed。 But they seldom employ these borrowed elements in quite the traditional way。 Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one with the other。 The inevitable result is what we must call, though the term is not quite right, a mis understanding between the two competing schools。 The laymen who scoffed at Einstein’s general theory of relativity because space could not be “curved”— it was not that sort of thing— were not simply wrong or mistaken。 Nor were the mathematicians, physicists, and philosophers who tried to develop a Euclidean version of Einstein’s theory。® What had previously been meant by space was necessarily flat, homogeneous, isotropic, and un affected by the presence of matter。 If it had not been, Newto nian physics would not have worked。 To make the transition to Einstein’s universe, the whole conceptual web whose strands are space, time, matter, force, and so on, had to be shifted and laid down again on nature whole。 Only men who had together undergone or failed to undergo that transformation would be able to discover precisely what they agreed or disagreed about。 Communication across the revolutionary divide is inevitably partial。 Consider, for another example, the men who called Copernicus mad because he proclaimed that the earth moved。 They were not either just wrong or quite wrong。 Part of what they meant by ‘earth’ was fixed position。 Their earth, at least, could not be moved。 Darwin, in a particularly perceptive passage at the end of his Origin of Species, wrote : “Although I am fully convinced of the truth of the views given in this volume 。 。 。 , I by no means expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with a multitude of facts all viewed, during a long course of years, from a point of view directly opposite to mine。 。 。 。 [B]ut I look with confidence to the future,— to young and rising naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the question with impartiality 。” And Max Planck, surveying his own career in his Scientific Autobiography, sadly remarked that “a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its oppo nents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it 。” Kuhn suggests that progress is perhaps not merely a feature, but the definition of a science。 For many centuries, both in antiquity and again in early modem Europe, painting was regarded as the cumulative discipline。 During those years the artist’s goal was assumed to be representation。 Critics and historians, like Pliny and Vasari, then recorded with veneration the series of inventions from foreshortening through chiaroscuro that had made possible successively more perfect representations of nature。 But those are also the years, particu larly during the Renaissance, when little cleavage was felt be tween the sciences and the arts。 Leonardo was only one of many men who passed freely back and forth between fields that only later became categorically distinct 。 In music, the graphic arts, and literature, the practitioner gains his educa tion by exposure to the works of other artists, principally earlier artists。 Textbooks, except compendia of or handbooks to original creations, have only a secondary role。 In history, philosophy, and the social sciences, textbook literature has a greater significance。 But even in these fields the elementary college course employs parallel readings in original sources, some of them the “classics” of the field, others the contemporary research reports that practitioners write for each other。 As a result, the student in any one of these disciplines is constantly made aware of the immense variety of problems that the members of his future group have, in the course of time, attempted to solve。 Even more important, he has constantly before him a number of competing and incommensurable solutions to these problems, solutions that he must ultimately evaluate for himselfContrast this situation with that in at least the contemporary natural sciences。 In these fields the student relies mainly on textbooks until, in his third or fourth year of graduate work, he begins his own research。。 For many men the abolition of that teleological kind of evolution was the most significant and least palatable of Darwin’s suggestions 。 5 The Origin of Species recognized no goal set either by God or nature。 Instead, natural selection, operating in the given environment and with the actual organisms presently at hand, was responsible for the gradual but steady emergence of more elaborate, further articulated, and vastly more specialized organisms。 It is not quite the case that logical and mathematical manipulation are applied directly to F = ma。 That expression proves on examination to be a law-sketch or a law-schema。 As the student or the practicing scientist moves from one problem situa tion to the next, the symbolic generalization to which such ma nipulations apply changes。 [。。。] For more complex situations [。。。] the family resemblance of which to F = ma is still harder to discover。 Yet, while learning to identify forces, masses, and accelerations in a variety of physical situations not previously encountered, the student has also learned to design the appropriate version of F = ma through which to interrelate them, often a version for which he has encountered no literal equivalent before。 How has he learned to do this?A phenomenon familiar to both students of science and his torians of science provides a clue。 The former regularly report that they have read through a chapter of their text, understood it perfectly, but nonetheless had difficulty solving a number of the problems at the chapter’s end。 Ordinarily, also, those diffi culties dissolve in the same way。 The student discovers, with or without the assistance of his instructor, a way to see his problem as like a problem he has already encountered。 Having seen the resemblance, grasped the analogy between two or more distinct problems, he can interrelate symbols and attach them to nature in the ways that have proved effective before。 The law-sketch, say f = ma, has functioned as a tool, informing the student what similarities to look for, signaling the gestalt in which the situation is to be seen。 The resultant ability to see a variety of situations as like each other, as subjects for F = ma or some other symbolic generalization, is, I think, the main thing a student acquires by doing exemplary problems, whether with a pencil and paper or in a well-designed laboratory。 After he has completed a certain number, which may vary widely from one individual to the next, he views the situations that confront him as a scientist in the same gestalt as other members of his specialists’ group。 For him they are no longer the same situations he had encountered when his training began。 He has meanwhile assimilated a time-tested and group-licensed way of seeing。 To translate a theory or worldview into one’s own lan guage is not to make it one’s own。 For that one must go nntive, discover that one is thinking and working in, not simply translat ing out of, a language that was previously foreign。 That transition is not, however, one that an individual may make or refrain from making by deliberation and choice, however good his rea sons for wishing to do so。 Instead, at some point in the process of learning to translate, he finds that the transition has occurred, that he has slipped into the new language without a decision having been made。 Or else, like many of those who first encoun tered, say, relativity or quantum mechanics in their middle years, he finds himself fully persuaded of the new view but nevertheless unable to internalize it and be at home in the world it helps to shape。 Intellectually such a man has made his choice, but the conversion required if it is to be effective eludes him。 He may use the new theory nonetheless, but he will do so as a foreigner in a foreign environment, an alternative available to him only because there are natives already there。 Imagine an evolutionary tree representing the development of the modem scientific specialties from their common origins in, say, primitive natural philosophy and the crafts。 A line drawn up that tree, never doubling back, from the tmnk to the tip of some branch would trace a succession of theories related by descent。 Considering any two such theories, chosen from points not too near their origin, it should be easy to design a list of cri teria that would enable an uncommitted observer to distinguish the earlier from the more recent theory time after time。 Among the most useful would be: accuracy of prediction, particularly of quantitative prediction; the balance between esoteric and every day subjsct matter; and the number of different problems solved。 Less useful for this purpose, though also important determinants of scientific life, would be such values as simplicity, scope, and compatibility with other specialties。 Those lists are not yet the ones required, but I have no doubt that they can be completed。 If they can, then scientific development is, like biological, a unidirectional and irreversible process。 Later scientific theories are better than earlier ones for solving puzzles in the often quite different environments to which they are applied。 。。。more

Ganimarepublic

Uzun uzun anlatmış ve olağanüstü bir kitap, evet。 Ben size kendi anladığım mini özeti yazayım:Bilimsel devrimlerin yapısı- bilim muhafazakardır, bilimadamı, olanı muhafaza etmeye çalışır。- yanlış soru doğru cevaplanamaz

Rajiv Chopra

This book is a classic。 I am still wrapping my head around it, as I have just finished the book。If you want to understand how scientific revolutions work, and how paradigms change, read this。 If you want to understand a book that you can - with modifications, - apply to other aspects of life, read this。 If you want to read a deep book that makes you think, read this。 In short - buy the book and read it。 After some time, read it again。

Momchil

This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers。 To view it, click here。 “But only the civilizations that descend from Hellenic Greece have possessed more than a rudimentary science。” The big piece of land called Asia was not found by the brilliant white men (is there a single female scientist in this read?) glorified in this book。 It was an okay book, there were some interesting ideas about the non linearity of scientific progress; the idea of paradigm shifts and the blueprint for a scientific revolution; his relativistic take on progress and knowledge was entertain “But only the civilizations that descend from Hellenic Greece have possessed more than a rudimentary science。” The big piece of land called Asia was not found by the brilliant white men (is there a single female scientist in this read?) glorified in this book。 It was an okay book, there were some interesting ideas about the non linearity of scientific progress; the idea of paradigm shifts and the blueprint for a scientific revolution; his relativistic take on progress and knowledge was entertaining, but I do believe we have developed probability theory to inform our lack of knowledge for exactly that purpose。 Another short coming is that the book is solely about physics (astronomy is physics) and chemistry。 The nuances of the breakthroughs in some other fields, especially the ones in their early stages without established paradigms yet would have been wonderful examples for the veracity of the assertions of the author。 *** 。。。more

Marc Dorval

I really enjoyed reading this book。 It took me a lot of time, though: I stopped repeatedly to think and digest, to talk and ask questions to people in scientific fields, and to look at current happenings in the fields of Neuroscience, psychology, and (these days) epidemiology。 It may have been written over 50 years ago, but I found the book's contents relevant and enlightening。 I really enjoyed reading this book。 It took me a lot of time, though: I stopped repeatedly to think and digest, to talk and ask questions to people in scientific fields, and to look at current happenings in the fields of Neuroscience, psychology, and (these days) epidemiology。 It may have been written over 50 years ago, but I found the book's contents relevant and enlightening。 。。。more

Bruno

Still an amazing book after all those years。 I must apologise to those who had to read my paper on this in second year at university。 Oh I still stand by that paper。 There is just so much more interesting stuff in this …

Marco

I get it that Mr。 Kuhn's bold claims required him to be very thorough in his analyses but good grief did I keep zoning out during his examples。But the idea of a shift in paradigm is a very good one, and I think people like Ken Wilber and other "consciousness developmentalists" put it to an interesting use。 I get it that Mr。 Kuhn's bold claims required him to be very thorough in his analyses but good grief did I keep zoning out during his examples。But the idea of a shift in paradigm is a very good one, and I think people like Ken Wilber and other "consciousness developmentalists" put it to an interesting use。 。。。more

Elia Mantovani

Mi trovo in imbarazzo quando devo provare a recensire una tale pietra miliare del pensiero scientifico e dell'analisi filosofica。 Gli assunti che hanno diffuso la teoria di Kuhn sono indubbiamente condivisibili (la dinamica del cambio di paradigma, la "theory-ladenness", la risoluzione di rompicapi della scienza normale, ecc。) anche se, per ammissione stessa dell'autore, questi sono presentati circondati da un'aura di vaghezza e ineffabilità che ne rende complesso l'effettivo riconoscimento。 Val Mi trovo in imbarazzo quando devo provare a recensire una tale pietra miliare del pensiero scientifico e dell'analisi filosofica。 Gli assunti che hanno diffuso la teoria di Kuhn sono indubbiamente condivisibili (la dinamica del cambio di paradigma, la "theory-ladenness", la risoluzione di rompicapi della scienza normale, ecc。) anche se, per ammissione stessa dell'autore, questi sono presentati circondati da un'aura di vaghezza e ineffabilità che ne rende complesso l'effettivo riconoscimento。 Valuto tre stelle non per il contenuto, che è valido in forza della sua argomentazione logica e della sua raffinata erudizione e indipendentemente dall'eventuale accordo tra scrittore e lettore, ma per lo stile dello scienziato: asciutto, inutilmente ostentante un ampissimo bacino di conoscenze, poco nitido, controverso。 Insomma, l'opera difficilmente si preseterebbe all'apprezzamento autonomo senza una buona introduzione (anche manualistica) prima。 。。。more

Lavanya Karthikeyan

Interesting read。 The author seems to contradict himself while explaining incommensurability between two scientific communities subscribing to different paradigms。 The postscript adds to the confusion regarding this issue。 He explicitly states that the incommensurability goes beyond linguistic aspects and cannot be clarified with just an explanation on what each group means when they use a certain term x。 Then goes on to suggest better communication and explanation of terms as one of the solutio Interesting read。 The author seems to contradict himself while explaining incommensurability between two scientific communities subscribing to different paradigms。 The postscript adds to the confusion regarding this issue。 He explicitly states that the incommensurability goes beyond linguistic aspects and cannot be clarified with just an explanation on what each group means when they use a certain term x。 Then goes on to suggest better communication and explanation of terms as one of the solutions。 。。。more

Eric Phetteplace

Liked it but didn't bother finishing it。 Perhaps this is trite but coming from a 20th century theory background, the idea "your paradigm defines what conclusions you can come to" is not much of a breakthrough。 Further, Kuhn struggles ascend past the "great man" theory of history; his periods and examples are mostly labelled by proper names。 Someone more familiar with the physical sciences and specific theories discussed might find this more interesting。 Liked it but didn't bother finishing it。 Perhaps this is trite but coming from a 20th century theory background, the idea "your paradigm defines what conclusions you can come to" is not much of a breakthrough。 Further, Kuhn struggles ascend past the "great man" theory of history; his periods and examples are mostly labelled by proper names。 Someone more familiar with the physical sciences and specific theories discussed might find this more interesting。 。。。more

Kirill Protasenia

Scientist about science and about scientists who argue on science。 Additions of 1969 are key to the piece。

Ashwani Gupta

A classic that I wish I'd read in college。 Provides invaluable insights into the history and philosophy of science。 The book requires some effort to read as the writing style is quite formal and sometimes a bit cryptic, but the effort is totally worth it。 The book shines even now, more than fifty years after it was written。 Should be required reading for anyone contemplating a career in science or technology。 A classic that I wish I'd read in college。 Provides invaluable insights into the history and philosophy of science。 The book requires some effort to read as the writing style is quite formal and sometimes a bit cryptic, but the effort is totally worth it。 The book shines even now, more than fifty years after it was written。 Should be required reading for anyone contemplating a career in science or technology。 。。。more

Allisonperkel

Somewhat repetitive, overall fascinating read into the nature of scientific change。

Ian Ferguson

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn describes how science progresses between alternating periods of normal research and crisis。 Only crisis allows for the revolutionary shifts in paradigms which have created the modern scientific understanding of the universe。 While Kuhn’s description of the history of science is essential, an equally important contribution is Kuhn’s emphasis on what science is not, namely, a series of incremental contributions over all time towards a consist In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn describes how science progresses between alternating periods of normal research and crisis。 Only crisis allows for the revolutionary shifts in paradigms which have created the modern scientific understanding of the universe。 While Kuhn’s description of the history of science is essential, an equally important contribution is Kuhn’s emphasis on what science is not, namely, a series of incremental contributions over all time towards a consistent goal。 Kuhn also elegantly enumerates the roles of normal science which occupy the majority of practitioners during non-crisis times and recounts several often overlooked turning points in the development of scientific thought。 Though The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is probably most valuable for fledgling scientists beginning professional research (at the end of undergraduate or beginning of graduate studies), it is certainly entertaining and informative for any reader and helps to correct misconceptions about the meaning of science that are all too prevalent in contemporary society。 。。。more

Kevin Whitaker

Kuhn's argument in brief: - Any sufficiently advanced scientific field has an established "paradigm。" This describes its basic theories, concepts, and assumptions -- basically, the things you could put in a textbook that pretty much everyone working in the field would agree with, instead of having to argue everything from first principles。 Alternative theories may still exist, but they are basically ignored。 Examples of paradigms include Aristotle and Ptolemy's view that stars and planets revolv Kuhn's argument in brief: - Any sufficiently advanced scientific field has an established "paradigm。" This describes its basic theories, concepts, and assumptions -- basically, the things you could put in a textbook that pretty much everyone working in the field would agree with, instead of having to argue everything from first principles。 Alternative theories may still exist, but they are basically ignored。 Examples of paradigms include Aristotle and Ptolemy's view that stars and planets revolved around the Earth, or Dalton's theory that matter is composed of indivisible atoms。 - A paradigm doesn't explain everything at first; it only has to answer a few key questions, or explain a few key phenomena well, to be accepted。 Thus, the work of most researchers is to increase knowledge within that paradigm: identifying what other theories derive from it, expressing them more elegantly, and discovering facts consistent with it。 This might include predicting the movement of the planets within the Aristotle-Ptolemy paradigm, or finding elements and measuring their atomic weights within Dalton's。 - However, this work often results in the discovery of anomalies -- findings that contradict the paradigm。 These are generally dismissed at first (often by blaming the researcher who found it), or the existing theories are tweaked to make the paradigm consistent again。 But if the explanations are so complicated or uncompelling, they may throw the field into a state of crisis。 Although the geocentric paradigm worked for predicting the movement of planets and stars, it was unable to explain the timing of the solstices properly, and attempts to fix the theory became huge kludges- During a state of crisis, a new paradigm may be accepted if it does a better job of explaining the discrepancy -- this is the "revolution" in Kuhn's title, or a paradigm shift。 Often, this paradigm had already been developed by some maverick scientist or philosopher, but it was dismissed because the original paradigm was still working fine at that point: heliocentrism was first proposed by Aristarchus in ancient Greece, 18 centuries before Copernicus and Galileo articulated the model that would eventually catch on。 The new paradigm may face resistance, but eventually it is adopted, kicking off a new direction for "normal science" to find new facts or theories that are exposed by the new paradigm。 For example, the heliocentric framework caused astronomers to look in new places in the skies and see new planets and comets that they had not paid attention to before。It's not super novel today, but it seems to have been groundbreaking in Kuhn's time, and it's surprisingly readable -- concise and written plainly, except when it comes to explaining the actual examples (Kuhn pretty much only writes about the branches of physics)。 It's a great mental model for scientific progress and worth reading even today。 。。。more

SeyedMahdi Hosseini

تا قبل از بخش نهم کتاب «ساختار انقلابهای علمی» نوشته «تامس کوهن» ترجمه «دکتر سعید زیباکلام» نشر «سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاهها (سمت)»، درک بعضی از مفاهیم برایم سخت بود و مطالعه‌ی آن دشوار، اما پافشاری در مطالعه‌ی چنین کتاب مهمی باعث شد از بخش نهم تا انتهای کتاب برایم بسیار لذت‌بخش شود و نکات برجسته‌ای را بیاموزم。 نکاتی که موجب تحولی بنیادین در نحوه‌ی نگریستن به برخی امور گردید。 در آدرس ذیل برخی از قسمتهای کتاب را که برایم جذاب بودند و زیر آنها خط کشیدم، نوشته‌ام。 شایان ذکر است تا قبل از بخش نهم کتاب «ساختار انقلابهای علمی» نوشته «تامس کوهن» ترجمه «دکتر سعید زیباکلام» نشر «سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاهها (سمت)»، درک بعضی از مفاهیم برایم سخت بود و مطالعه‌ی آن دشوار، اما پافشاری در مطالعه‌ی چنین کتاب مهمی باعث شد از بخش نهم تا انتهای کتاب برایم بسیار لذت‌بخش شود و نکات برجسته‌ای را بیاموزم。 نکاتی که موجب تحولی بنیادین در نحوه‌ی نگریستن به برخی امور گردید。 در آدرس ذیل برخی از قسمتهای کتاب را که برایم جذاب بودند و زیر آنها خط کشیدم، نوشته‌ام。 شایان ذکر است درک بهتر مفاهیم آن، مستلزم همراه شدن با نویسنده از ابتدا تا انتهای کتاب می‌باشد。 شاید اگر فرصتی باشد و بتوان کتاب را یک بار دیگر از ابتدا تا انتها مطالعه کرد، فصول اول آن نیز جذابیت خود را نمایش دهند。https://b2n。ir/e76526 。。。more

Ramón Cornejo-Muñoz

Libro Semana 17/52: "La estructura de las revoluciones científicas", de Thomas S。 Kuhn, es uno de esos libros que debes leerlo para entender realmente qué es la filosofía de la ciencia。 Con un lenguaje en extremo claro se nos muestran 2 palabras que hoy en día tienen gran trascendencia, una prostituida y otra desconocida。 La primera es "paradigma", una forma de ver el mundo desde la ciencia e "inconmensurabilidad", la imposibilidad de comparar dos paradigmas científicos。Así, Kuhn nos muestras qu Libro Semana 17/52: "La estructura de las revoluciones científicas", de Thomas S。 Kuhn, es uno de esos libros que debes leerlo para entender realmente qué es la filosofía de la ciencia。 Con un lenguaje en extremo claro se nos muestran 2 palabras que hoy en día tienen gran trascendencia, una prostituida y otra desconocida。 La primera es "paradigma", una forma de ver el mundo desde la ciencia e "inconmensurabilidad", la imposibilidad de comparar dos paradigmas científicos。Así, Kuhn nos muestras que los cambios de paradigma son los que finalmente hacen que la ciencia cambie de rumbo a través de una "revolución"。 La mayoría de las veces, los científicos pasan toda su vida investigando un área específica de su campo, a la cual hacen una contribución minúscula, sintiendo que con esto se ha contribuido a la ciencia。 Este filosofo explica el cómo esto no genera el cambio de paradigma como tal, ya que estos no se logran a pequeños pasos, sino rompiendo los esquemas en cómo se plantean las preguntas y sus respuesta。 Para ser generosos, cada uno de esos granos de arena si sirven, a vista de Kuhn, pero sólo para generar la presión necesaria para que "emerja" esta visión transformadora。Recomendable para quienes les interese la filosofía de la ciencia。 Con esto ya empezaré a leer a Popper más formalmente, que era el predecesor intelectual de Kuhn y que tenía una mirada distinta sobre el cómo la ciencia avanza y se transforma。#Laestructuradelasrevolucionescientíficas #ThomasKuhn #filosofiadelaciencia #filosofia #readingchalleng #goodreads 。。。more

Mary Stevens

I read this book 43 years ago as a course text for an MA in theUSA。 It was revolutionary thinking and I found it tough reading it four weeks post C Section with a new baby。It was well worth the effort

Basel

While we easily tend to view the scientific knowledge growing in a linear path, just new knowledge building upon or improving old knowledge, such progress isn't always as it seems。 In Thomas Kuhn's famous work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, attempts to demonstrate that scientific revolutions go beyond a simple shift in the current scientific paradigm。 Such revolutions end up even presenting themselves as a shift in world view where the scientist's previous world becomes different with While we easily tend to view the scientific knowledge growing in a linear path, just new knowledge building upon or improving old knowledge, such progress isn't always as it seems。 In Thomas Kuhn's famous work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, attempts to demonstrate that scientific revolutions go beyond a simple shift in the current scientific paradigm。 Such revolutions end up even presenting themselves as a shift in world view where the scientist's previous world becomes different with the new paradigm。 Such a shift allows scientists to observe new phenomena, for instance, using the same tools they had before since such phenomena "didn't exist" in their old world。 A famous exemple is how a change in the world view concerning the planets and stars opened the path to numerous new discoveries that weren't possible before。 Kuhn is a great writer。 He's very clear in his demonstrations and his book is accessible to everyone。 You don't have to a specialist in philosophy or a scientific field in order to appreciate this work。 Just a sense of wonder will do。 There are numerous points and things to be learned from this book, but I admit, the shift in world view is the one that fascinated the most。 It is a clear invitation to re-examine our understanding of scientific history, and let's us ask ourselves: how will our world change in the future? 。。。more

Chichi Lalescu

An interesting and worthwhile read。Kuhn argues, with examples, that science advances in discontinuous leaps: Communities of scientists are defined by shared methods and beliefs (or theories), and their main activity is to work out the repercussions of their beliefs, and compare them with experiments。 As experiments improve, and new technology allows for new types of experiments, theoretical predictions fail, generating a crisis --- at which point the community enters a new mode of operation, gen An interesting and worthwhile read。Kuhn argues, with examples, that science advances in discontinuous leaps: Communities of scientists are defined by shared methods and beliefs (or theories), and their main activity is to work out the repercussions of their beliefs, and compare them with experiments。 As experiments improve, and new technology allows for new types of experiments, theoretical predictions fail, generating a crisis --- at which point the community enters a new mode of operation, generating alternative models in a fairly chaotic fashion until a new model of "the world" is found, that is capable of resolving the previous inconsistencies between theory and experiment。 This process actually generates cycles of calm/revolution/calm/revolution etc。I personally find the text relatively hard to parse, except for the comments added in 1970, which make things much more clear。 It is also hard for me to ignore the fact that I found out versions of his ideas before reading the book, so I may be giving him less credit than he deserves。 However, even given my prior knowledge, I found the book fascinating, because of the interesting mix of old style, modern concepts, and guesses about the workings of the human mind。 I'm pretty sure those were guesses, since he was writing before 1950。 。。。more

Heli

This is not a work about the history of scientific revolutions。 It is a work about the psychological changes occurring in the minds of scientists。 It's about concept development/conceptual change。 Anyone reading it as a work about history of science will misunderstand him。 Summary in 2 sentences: Knowledge (incl premises, paradigm) changes perception。 If you get new knowledge, the world around you as you can see it will change for your perception。The language is complicated, but the point is val This is not a work about the history of scientific revolutions。 It is a work about the psychological changes occurring in the minds of scientists。 It's about concept development/conceptual change。 Anyone reading it as a work about history of science will misunderstand him。 Summary in 2 sentences: Knowledge (incl premises, paradigm) changes perception。 If you get new knowledge, the world around you as you can see it will change for your perception。The language is complicated, but the point is valuable。 He wrote it over half a century ago, but scientists still think that wherever they are right now is the truth about how the world works。 This work should be a humbling reminder for us to occasionally step back and think how we can misunderstand the whole area we're researching; what are our premises we take for granted, why we think they are the truth, whether they are true or something else would be true, what would that mean for the field you're studying。 。。。more

N

Science should really be called sciencing, and school would’ve been a dramatically different place had this been our sciencing textbook instead of the ridiculous crap we were fed。 It is a matter of great embarrassment that I never seriously considered reading this book believing I had (through its copious use in any consequent work of philosophy of science) understood and formulated quite well its underlying idea of the paradigm and the phenomena of a paradigm shift。 Didn’t seem like a mind-blow Science should really be called sciencing, and school would’ve been a dramatically different place had this been our sciencing textbook instead of the ridiculous crap we were fed。 It is a matter of great embarrassment that I never seriously considered reading this book believing I had (through its copious use in any consequent work of philosophy of science) understood and formulated quite well its underlying idea of the paradigm and the phenomena of a paradigm shift。 Didn’t seem like a mind-blowing insight either。 Yet, there is nothing obvious or self-evident about the argumentation in this book, a remarkable experience given how intuitive and unsurprising the resulting tenets are。 This is a work of such fundament, profundity, and intricacy that the crystallized concept of a paradigm does no justice to it, a great example of how underrated the word philosophy is in ‘philosophy of science’, whose center of gravity still veers towards science, ie a constructivist internally consistent axiomatic system whose philosophy will be discovered analytically to yield a philosophy of science, rather than the other way around, ie applying the rules, functions and operators of the entirely different discipline of philosophy to discover patterns, blind spots, and inconsistencies in the scientific method, a philosophy of science in the vein of f(x)。 It’s incredible how this single idea can explain some of the most burning questions in science (Weltanschauung paradox explains replication crisis, ahistoricity of scientific teaching explains the rift with theology despite being more similar, as an authority, than different)。 For all its depth, this book is still appetizingly incomplete, for we aren’t given paradigms that go backwards, or sideways, or in circles, and there’s nothing here that suggests they’d be impossible。 NotesShouldn’t ask what connection between Galileo’s theories and present day canon, but instead connection between his theories and the prevalent mode of thought around himElectricity: 1) Attraction force。 Repulsion as rebound side-effect。 2) Attraction/Repulsion both。 3) Fluid flowing through conductor。 Each couldn’t explain 1 feature of the other。 Franklin combined them through his experiments。 Abstract out characteristics of rules/problems to arrive at the paradigm。 Rules emerge from paradigms。 But paradigms can inform even without rules。Can identify a paradigm without realizing/interpreting it, like accepting Newton/Einstein’s particular solutions while disagreeing on principles that produced themHow to use a noun like Chair: set of attributes that all chairs have, and only chairs have。 Wittg: nein。 Family resemblance to chairs we have seen before。 Network of overlapping resemblances。 Scientific education: never learn concepts abstractly, always theory that has strong applications, and historical pathways。 Problem solving / experimentation。 Not concepts of time, force, mass, but their application。Is an He2 atom a molecule? Chemist: yes, kinetic theory of gases。 Physicist: No, molecular spectrum。Anomalies:Difficulty of ‘when was O2 discovered?’。 Needs not only ‘that something is’ (observation) but also ‘what something is’ (conceptualization)。 Priestley had former, but under existing paradigm of phlogiston。 Lavoisier started journey of latter, Chemical Revolution of ‘oxygen theory of combustion’, having already harbored doubts about phlogiston theory。 Priestley discovered O2, then Lavoisier invented it?Roentgen’s cathode ray screen glowed when it shouldn’t。 New paradigm of particle that has light-like property: X-rays。 Though radiation was known, why was X-ray not accomodated like additional element into periodic table? Anomaly in well-established cathode ray set-up, would retrospectively need a lot of work to be redone now。 Leyden Jar: no paradigm of electricity (aether, fluid)。 Anomaly noted, then observation and theorizing converge, then paradigm is updated。 When shown playing cards that have anomalies, black 4 Heart, Red 6 Spade, even when shown 40x longer than normal cards, 10% of anomalies not identified。 Crises:Paradigm shift both destructive (discard beliefs/procedures) and constructive (replace in order to account for wider swathe of observation)。 Ptolemaic -> Copernican。 Aristotelian mechanics -> Galilean。 Anomalous length of spectrum -> Newtonian light。 Diffraction/Polarization -> Wave theory of light。 Blackbody/Photoelectric -> Quantum mechanics。 Anomalies known for long time, building crisis。 For Planets, Ptolemaic is great。 Still used as engineering approximation for planets。 But incomplete - anomaly of equinox precession。Pneumatic Chemistry; air pump shows air is active ingredient in reactions。 Paradigm: air is the only gas。 Though evidence of distinct nature of fixed air (CO2), must be difference in purity of air。 Decreasing utility of phlogiston theory。 Weight gain during burning/rusting。 Newton’s theory deduced weight gain = mass gain。 Perhaps phlogiston had negative weight, then released? Crisis - Priestley/ Cavendish / Lavoisier / Scheele: Oxidation。Leibniz criticism of newtonian absolute space, was purely philosophical, didn’t conceive of an observational difference。 Wave theory: why no observed drift through Newtonian ether? Maxwell’s EM: how to incorporate ether drag into theory? Crisis -> Special relativity。 More than 1 theoretical construction can always be made to fit body of data。 So why isn’t it done? “As in manufacture so in science—retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it。 The significance of crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for retooling has arrived”Rejection of a paradigm is always simultaneous with acceptance of new one。 Until then, anomalies don’t cause rejection。 Very few paradigms resolve all problems。 When they do, geometric optics, they stop yielding research problems and become only tools for engineering。 Otherwise, all normal science’s research problems are counterinstances and sources of crisis。 Necessity for Revolution:“the analytical thought experimentation of Galileo, Einstein, Bohr is perfectly calculated to expose the old paradigm to existing knowledge in ways that isolate the root of crisis with a clarity unattainable in the laboratory”“Political revolutions aim to change political institutions in ways that those institutions themselves prohibit” and “In increasing numbers individuals become increasingly estranged from political life and behave more and more eccentrically within it。 Then, as the crisis deepens, many of these individuals commit themselves to some concrete proposal for the reconstruction of society in a new institutional framework。 At that point the society is divided into competing camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, the others seeking to institute some new one。 And, once that polarization has occurred, political recourse fails。 Because they differ about the institutional matrix within which political change is to be achieved and evaluated, because they acknowledge no supra-institutional framework for the adjudication of revolutionary difference”1) phenomena well-explained by paradigm, nature gives no reason to revise。 2) paradigm explains nature of phenomena, but requires further detailing/elaboration, into which research effort is concentrated。 Only when these attempts fail 3) anomalies, that require new paradigmExplanatory power of Phlogiston: why metals more similar to each other than their ores (combine with common phlogiston), acid reactions, why volume decrease in combustion (phlogiston ‘spoils’ elasticity of air), etc。 Weltanschauung: Gestalt psych: goggles that invert vision first causes acute distress, disorientation。 Then brain adjusts and flips the scene automatically。 Same for scientific paradigm。 Sunspots, new stellar objects identified in sky after Copernicus, whereas China for whom heavens were never ‘static’ like Ptolemaic, had seen far before。Aristotelian conceptual categories of falling body: height to which raised, resistance of medium, weight, time to rest。 Cannot lead to Galilean laws。 Galileo’s different gestalt - Medium agnostic from Archimedes。 Symmetric motion from Impetus theory。 Circular form of motion from Neoplatonism。 So unlike Aristotle, Galileo measured radius, weight, angular displacement, time per swing, yielding new paradigm of pendulum。 Regularities。 Aristotelian motion: stone changes state during fall (only avg speed, ie total distance / time)。 Pulled by ground, so only matters distance to ground not from source。 Impetus theory: soaks up more impetus with time, so distance from source matters more。 “The scientist or philosopher who asks what measurements or retinal imprints make the pendulum what it is must already be able to recognize a pendulum when he sees one。 If he saw constrained fall instead, his question could not even be asked。 And if he saw a pendulum, but saw it in the same way he saw a tuning fork or an oscillating balance, his question could not be answered”Affinity theory paradigm: elements have affinity for each other, in a compound, those with more affinity will combine (Ag has more affinity for acid than for itself, Cu has more affinity for acid than does Ag causing precipitate)。 Explains homogeneity。 So physical mixtures vs chemical compounds。 But what about those in middle, like salt water。 Why does physical mixture of air not have O2 (heavier) sink to bottom? Dalton, with no chemistry background, studying physical mixture of gases in water, saw things differently: law of constant proportions (chemical compound has atoms combining only in whole-number ratios, anything else is not purely chemical), could not have been proved under previous paradigm, now could not be disproved by new paradigm!Invisible Revolution:Science, unlike any other creative pursuit, is like theology, a source of authority。 Textbooks communicate vocab and syntax of the current scientific language。 Popularizing books describe these in everyday words。 Philosophy of science examines logical structure of this。 Science communication, like textbooks, a) selectively choose history of the discovery to make progress look linear b) remove concept of revolutions。 If anomalies, contradictions pop up within paradigm, that’s fine then research can investigate。 But what if paradigm is so self-contained that it is fully consistent while being wrong?Why only science makes progress? Semantic question: only that which can show progress is deemed a science。 But is not any individual work (of art for instance) that adds to the collective body of work, progress? New paradigms, at first, do worse than the old。 Developing methods, data, questions, means they are rougher, and potentially explain fewer phenomenon (like Ptolemaic answering more than Copernican in the beginning)。 Gradual conversion of scientists until they are majority, and start seriously pursuing the new paradigm。Art has museums, literature has library of classics, that all students learn。 But science textbook only has contemporary science。 When new paradigm, all books/articles under old paradigm are renounced。 Scientists see only gains of scientific revolution, not its losses。 Scientists want new paradigm to 1) answer some well-known problem/anomaly 2) not require abandonment of large part of problem-solving ability already developed。 Reluctance to accept Darwin 1859: not because of evolution mechanism, natural selection, for which evidence had been accumulating for many years。 But because rejection of teleology: steadily from primitive beginning but toward no goal。 Evolution doesn’t mean towards an ideal of perfection。 Similarly, scientific progress, merely better adjusted to its environment。 Vicious circle: paradigm is one that scientific community shares, but scientific community is one that shares a paradigm。 Communities evolve, and through them paradigms and revolutions。 Before mid-1900s, no physics community, evolved out of natural philosophers and mathematicians。 Philosophic difference between relations (H = IR*2t, Joule Lenz law), and definitions (f = ma, V = I/R)。 Tacit Knowledge: picked up through experience。 Not subjective, because a) it is not individual, exists in same way among group, b) it is not random, can be shown to have patterns and c) natural selection of subjective differences in perception of stimuli, such that the reliable interpretations of stimuli (distinguish wolf from dog) are worth passing on。“To translate a theory or worldview into one’s own language is not to make it one’s own。 For that one must go native, discover that one is thinking and working in, not simply translating out of, a language that was previously foreign。 At some point in the process of learning to translate, he finds that the transition has occurred, that he has slipped into the new language without a decision having been made”"they inevitably disguise not only the role but the very existence of the revolutions that produced them。 Unless he has personally experienced a revolution in his own lifetime, the historical sense either of the working scientist or of the lay reader of textbook literature extends only to the outcome of the most recent revolutions in the field。 Textbooks thus begin by truncating the scientist’s sense of his discipline’s history and then proceed to supply a substitute for what they have eliminated。""The temptation to write history backward is both omnipresent and perennial。 But scientists are more affected by the temptation to rewrite history, partly because the results of scientific research show no obvious dependence upon the historical context of the inquiry, and partly because, except during crisis and revolution, the scientist’s contemporary position seems so secure。""theories too do not evolve piecemeal to fit facts that were there all the time。 Rather, they emerge together with the facts they fit from a revolutionary reformulation of the preceding scientific tradition, a tradition within which the knowledge-mediated relationship between the scientist and nature was not quite the same。" 。。。more

Maja

Everyone should read this。

Nicki

Very interesting and thought-provoking。 Was much highlighted。

JJ Shankar

Quite a bit more philosophical than I generally like to read, and comes across as somewhat dated, but it's one of those very few books I'd describe as "visionary", and I'm so glad that I finally had some time to complete it。 With great clarity, insight, and nuance, Kuhn breaks down the inner-workings of the scientific discipline from the refreshing perspective of a historian。 His model, which puts the communal aspect of science at front-and-center, disentangles science from an ideal of linear "p Quite a bit more philosophical than I generally like to read, and comes across as somewhat dated, but it's one of those very few books I'd describe as "visionary", and I'm so glad that I finally had some time to complete it。 With great clarity, insight, and nuance, Kuhn breaks down the inner-workings of the scientific discipline from the refreshing perspective of a historian。 His model, which puts the communal aspect of science at front-and-center, disentangles science from an ideal of linear "progress" toward truth, and sheds great light upon how sciences evolve over time, and why science, for the most part, works so efficiently and effectively。 For anyone interested in a dense interdisciplinary read, I'd highly recommend! 。。。more

Brady

Really great things being discussed here。 Dense reading。 Great discussion。

Shuaib Choudhry

Every so often there is a book that is so innovative in its exposition that it changes the paradigm that one views the subject in。 I hope Kuhn does not mind me using the very word he popularised but such is the gravity of the exposition。 Kuhn essentially changes how one views scientific progress, in fact there is no such thing in terms of true epistemic progress instead we have shifts in perspectives which allows the scientists to view the world in a new way but the nature of the world did not c Every so often there is a book that is so innovative in its exposition that it changes the paradigm that one views the subject in。 I hope Kuhn does not mind me using the very word he popularised but such is the gravity of the exposition。 Kuhn essentially changes how one views scientific progress, in fact there is no such thing in terms of true epistemic progress instead we have shifts in perspectives which allows the scientists to view the world in a new way but the nature of the world did not change even though for the scientists it seems so。 Now that's not to say there isn’t progress, there is a progress from an engineering point of view as the new paradigm emphasises new data to collect and thus needing new instrumentation to carry out such a task and thus leading to technological progress。 But this is not epistemic progress and it is not a cumulative process as most like to say it is。 This is in essence what defines scientific progress。 Kuhn outlines 4 different stages of the process of science; Pre-paradigm, normal science, crisis and revolution and this portrays scientific development as a succession of tradition bound periods punctuated by non-cumulative breaks is clear and concise in it's description。 As Kuhn describes these four stages he provides examples form the physical science and development of theory that has followed the process he has outlined and he also analyse this from a cultural and sociological perspective and what that means in regards to how scientists view themselves or their endeavours。 I'll finish with a final quote from the book and what it succinctly captures about humans and how they describe the world around them。 "No natural history can be interpreted in the absence of at least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation and criticism。 If that body of belief is not already implicit in the collection of facts it must be externally supplied perhaps by a current metaphysic。"Humans just can’t reason without a paradigm; it provides a canvas on which to imprint their thoughts and thus start the process of comprehending nature and this in essence is the process of the science: to explain the natural world we inhabit。 。。。more